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When Self-Regulation, Market Forces, and
Private Legal Actions Fail: Appropriate
Government Regulation and Oversight is
Necessary to Ensure Minimum Standards of
Quality in Long-Term Health Care
Alexander D. Eremia, J.D., L.L.M.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite having the most technologically advanced and costly
healthcare system in the world, both physicians and American
healthcare consumers have increasingly perceived a decline in
the quality of services provided by the medical community.'
While no nationally accepted and uniform standards exist which
succinctly define "quality of care," consumers expect and de-
serve at least the minimally prescribed or professionally ac-
cepted standards for the treatment of their ailments.
Historically, consumers have relied on self-regulation and the
professionalism of their physicians and health care providers to
ensure appropriate quality of care. Under the fee-for-service re-
gime, it is alleged that over-utilization led to excessive services
* Alexander D. Eremia received his Bachelor of Science from the University of
California, Santa Barbara, his Juris Doctor from DePaul College of Law where he was
a Staff Writer on the DePaul Journal of Health Care Law, and his Master of Laws in
Health Law from Loyola University Chicago School of Law where he was the Senior
Editor of the Annals of Health Law. Mr. Eremia is Assistant General Counsel of
Georgetown University Hospital and was formerly Associate Counsel for the Office
of the Inspector General, Office of Counsel to the Inspector General of the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services ("OIG") in Washington, D.C. and has repre-
sented the OIG in quality of care cases. The thoughts and ideas expressed herein are
the author's personal opinions and do not necessarily reflect the views of MedStar
Health, Inc., Georgetown University Hospital, the 0IG, the Department of Health
and Human Services, or the United States Government.
1. See, e.g., Press Release, Harvard School of Public Health, Doctors in Five
Countries See Decline in Quality of Care: New International Survey Reveals Physi-
cian Concerns with Medical Errors, a Shortage of Nurses, and Inadequate Facilities
(Oct. 12, 2000), at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/press/releases/press1O122000.html; see
also Marilyn Denny, This is Who I Am, Don't Let Them Move Me: Autonomy in
Nursing Homes, 2 QUINNIPIAc HEALTH L.J. 203, 208 (1999) (claiming that "physical
and psychological decline of residents, largely as a result of the treatment received in
such institutions, has led to the perception of nursing homes as 'houses of death."').
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and "quality."' 2 Today, some financial incentives which may en-
courage underutilization, and a number of prominent failure of
care incidents3 suggest a need to focus on quality and make it
clear that self-regulation alone cannot be the sole mechanism
for ensuring quality of care.4
Instead, consumers of health care services must rely on sev-
eral mechanisms to assure minimum levels of quality. In demo-
cratic, capitalist and free societies, social and economic norms
dictate that consumers purchase products and services primarily
on the basis of favorable quality and price. 5 Under such condi-
tions, providers of poor quality or excessive cost are forced from
the market because consumers refuse to utilize their services.
Although these economic norms are effective in many non-
health care markets, health care consumers do not always have
the requisite information or market freedom necessary to make
optimal quality and cost of care decisions. Even when appropri-
ate information and market choices are available, variables in-
cluding declining reimbursement or geographic limitations may
impede a consumer's ability to obtain quality health care.
In some instances, patients or residents have resorted to legal
action in an effort to redress actual harms. Seen by some health
care providers as a sufficient deterrent to prevent poor quality
practices, malpractice and wrongful death actions are often com-
pensatory in nature.6 In addition, individuals are frequently un-
successful in such actions, which are reactive rather than
proactive mechanisms for promoting quality of care. Moreover,
2. See Deborah A. Stone, The Doctor as Businessman: The Changing Politics of a
Cultural Icon, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 533, 553 (1997) (arguing that under the
fee-for-service system, doctors exploited generous health insurance policies to pro-
vide unnecessary and excessive "Cadillac-quality" services while lining their own
pockets).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Chester Care Ctr., No. 98 CV-139 (E.D. Pa. 1998)
(alleging various inadequacies in the care provided to residents); United States v.
GMS Mgmt.-Tucker, Inc., No. 96-1271 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (charging that claims were
submitted for care that was not rendered in compliance with federal regulations).
4. But see George E. Newton 1I, Maintaining the Balance: Reconciling the Social
and Judicial Costs of Medical Peer Review Protection, 52 ALA. L. REV. 723, 724-25
(2001) (discussing the virtues of peer review and quality improvement).
5. Andrew Ruskin, Empowering Patients to Act Like Consumers: A Proposal Cre-
ating Price and Quality Choice Within Health Care, 73 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 651, 652-53
(1999); see also Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical
Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 941-42 (1963) (distinguishing normative economics
from the economics of the health care industry).
6. David F. Bragg, Dealing with Nursing Home Neglect: The Need For Private Liti-
gation, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 1, 4 (1997) (arguing that "the only effective restraint on
those who allow their residents to be neglected is a serious threat to profits.").
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awards in these cases may have the unintended effect of limiting
the level of services and quality of care available to the rest of
the patient population. Finally, most providers carry ample lia-
bility insurance to cover such claims. As a result, the threat of a
negligence action alone may not be a sufficient deterrent to pre-
vent certain providers from furnishing substandard care.
As the largest purchaser of health care services in the world,
the United States Government has a vested interest in the pro-
motion of quality and the financial integrity of the healthcare
delivery system.7 In particular, it must ensure that beneficiaries
of Federal health care programs receive professionally accept-
able levels of care.8 Among the nation's most important health
care segments, the nation's nursing home industry has long been
criticized for providing poor quality of care to its residents. 9 In
response to multiple and recurring quality problems at long-
term care facilities, the federal and state governments have
sought to tighten, enhance or propose additional regulations and
licensing requirements to improve quality of care.10 Today, the
health care industry, and particularly the long-term care seg-
ment, are among the most heavily regulated businesses in the
nation.
Such enhanced regulation, oversight, and enforcement initia-
tives have often been criticized as being draconian, overly bur-
densome, 1 and the cause of unnecessary financial hardships that
7. See Lewis Morris & Gary W. Thompson, Reflections on the Government's Stick
and Carrot Approach to Fighting Health Care Fraud, 51 ALA. L. REV. 319, 319 (1999).
8. CMS Standards and Certification, 42 C.F.R. § 483.25 (2001) (stating that in long
term care facilities, "[e]ach resident must receive and the facility must provide the
necessary care and services to attain or maintain the highest practicable physical,
mental, and psychosocial well-being, in accordance with the comprehensive assess-
ment and plan of care.").
9. See John F. Schnelle et al., Policy Without Technology: A Barrier to Improving
Nursing Home Care, GERONTOLOGIST, Aug. 1, 1997, available at 1997 WL 27954312
(citing multiple articles in the medical and lay literature that document poor quality of
care provided in this country's nursing homes).
10. See, e.g., The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(a)-
(h), 1396r(a)-(h) (West Supp. 1999); see also Sen. Charles Grassley, The Resurrection
of Nursing Home Reform: A Historical Account of the Recent Revival of the Quality of
Care Standards for Long-Term Care Facilities Established in the Omnibus Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1987, 7 ELDER L.J. 267, 281-82 (1999) (explaining that additional legisla-
tive initiatives may be necessary to ensure that the Congressional intent of COBRA is
maintained); Press Release, HHS, Clinton Administration Announces New Initiatives
to Improve the Quality of Care in Nursing Homes (July 21, 1998), at http://www.
hhs.gov/news/press/1998pres/980721a.html (unveiling multiple new approaches to im-
prove nursing home care).
11. See generally Mark S. Williams, Are Federal Health Care Fraud Investigations
Harming the Practice of Medicine?, 4 HEALTH CARE FRAUD & ABUSE NEWSL. 4, May
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actually contribute to diminishing levels of care. Some com-
mentators have also argued that such micro-regulation without
an emphasis on measuring clinical outcomes is not an effective
means for improving quality of care. 2
This paper examines why market forces, self-regulation, and
private litigation, individually and collectively, have generally
not been successful paradigms for ensuring quality health care.
This paper also explores the federal government's role in pro-
moting quality, deterring substandard care, and overseeing the
healthcare industry. Particular attention will be paid to the reg-
ulatory and oversight framework in the long-term care industry.
Finally, some of the federal government's regulatory inadequa-
cies are examined, but ultimately, this paper concludes that con-
sistent, appropriate, and meaningful government regulation and
oversight are currently necessary to confront identified serious
systemic deficiencies in the delivery of long-term health care
services.
II. SELF-REGULATION, MARKET FORCES AND PRIVATE
TORT ACTIONS
Traditionally, Federal health care programs and third-party
payor reimbursement systems reimbursed providers of health
care services with minimal regard for the cost of care.' 3 Instead,
providers focused on providing efficacious services that were re-
imbursable. As reimbursement mechanisms have shifted to
managed care and the prospective payment system ("PPS"), fi-
nancial incentives to limit the level of services provided have
given consumers the perception that overall quality has dimin-
ished. 4 In fact, limiting the level of services by cutting staff,
limiting stays, or otherwise curtailing the type and quantity of
2001 (contending that formal programs to ensure compliance with federal health care
laws and regulations represent another example of "vague and onerous government
oversight in an already heavily regulated service industry.").
12. See Marshall B. Kapp, Quality of Care and Quality of Life in Nursing Facilities:
What's Regulation Got to Do With It?, 31 McGEORGE L. REv. 707, 714 (2000) (claim-
ing "there is a strong argument for concentrating regulatory activities on assuring that
satisfactory outcomes are achieved.").
13. See Stone, supra note 2, at 533 (noting that until the late 1970s, doctors and
policy makers believed that clinical decisionmaking should not be colored by the fi-
nancial interests of those providing the care).
14. See Ruskin, supra note 5, at 651-52 (citing widespread accounts of consumer
dissatisfaction with managed care); but see Stone, supra note 2, at 533 (noting that
under managed care, "a good doctor takes financial considerations into account in
making clinical decisions.").
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services does potentially contribute to quality of care deficien-
cies.1 5 Mechanisms historically and currently employed to pro-
mote minimum quality of care standards while limiting cost have
not always proven to be effective, and one single paradigm may
not be adequate for every segment of the health care industry.' 6
A. Self-Regulatory Measures
Because clinical decisions affect the level and quality of care
provided to patients throughout the health care continuum, it is
logical that self-evaluative measures should be among the most
efficient mechanisms for promoting consistent quality. How-
ever, with the emergence of various cost containment measures,
physicians have been forced to consider cost when making
clinical decisions. Some physicians complain in particular that
managed care has caused them to lose their autonomy in the
medical decision making process.17 Under this cost containment
mechanism, managed care organizations purport to regulate the
level and quality of care, yet many consumers disfavor managed
care because of its perceived limitations on care and choice.18 In
some cases, managed care participating physicians may be finan-
cially rewarded for limiting care, adding to the perception that
managed contributes to diminished quality. 19 While this finan-
cial reward is often nominal, there is the appearance and possi-
bility that professional judgment may be compromised, thereby
15. See HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., REPORT TO CONGRESS: APPROPRIATENESS
OF MINIMUM NURSE STAFFING RATIOS IN NURSING HOMES 7 (2000), available at
http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/reports/rp700hmp.htm (concluding that there may be a
critical ratio of nurses to residents, under which nursing home residents are substan-
tially at risk for quality of care problems); see also J. Scott Andresen, Comment, Is
Utilization Review the Practice of Medicine? Implications for Managed Care Adminis-
trators, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 431, 432 (1998) (commenting that because "[utilization re-
view] may severely limit or ration the amount of health care available, it has an
inherent potential to deprive individuals of the quality of care to which they have
become accustomed.").
16. See Gail B. Agrawal, Resuscitating Professionalism: Self-Regulation in the
Medical Marketplace, 66 Mo. L. REV. 341, 343-44 (2001) (acknowledging that profes-
sional self-regulation has been blamed for the escalation in health care spending and
is widely viewed as ineffective).
17. See Stone, supra note 2, at 552-54.
18. See Humphrey Taylor, Hostility to Managed Care Continues to Grow; But It Is
Far From Overwhelming, THE HARRIS POLL, July 29, 1998, at http://harrisinteractive.
com/harris-poll/index.asp?PID=170 (finding that a 47%-40% plurality of the public
believes that the increasing presence of managed care is a bad thing and that a 58%-
31% majority believe this increasing presence will harm the quality of patient care
currently provided).
19. See Stone, supra note 2, at 548.
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weakening the argument in favor of physician self-regulation."a
Although designed to be a cost containment strategy and quality
control strategy, pre-authorization and prospective utilization
review by non-clinical decision-makers may actually diminish
quality of care if non-clinical judgments are substituted for the
physician's judgments.21
Some commentators have suggested that improved quality as-
surance practices, enhanced practice guidelines, 22 or other self-
regulatory measures such as improved peer-review processes23
can restore consumer confidence in the health care delivery sys-
tem and ensure that minimum standards of quality of care are
met.24 Others suggest that outcome-oriented credentialing of
physicians, with an increased focus on ways to measure quality
of care, will have a significant impact on professional and insti-
tutional practices, 25 or that professional standards are an over-
looked determinant of physician conduct that may be preferable
to market forces or government oversight to ensure quality of
care.2 6 While acknowledging that self-regulatory activities need
not be entirely voluntary and may be encouraged, sanctioned, or
mandated by government action, it is argued that physicians are
the constant force in health care and are arguably responsible
for allocating most healthcare resources. 27 Therefore, it is sug-
gested that cooperative self-regulation can better facilitate vol-
untary conduct when deviant conduct goes undetected by
market forces and government regulation.28
20. But see JEFFERY STODDARD et al, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS.
CHANGE, ISSUE BRIEF: PHYSICIANS MORE LIKELY TO FACE QUALITY INCENTIVES
THAN INCENTIVES THAT MAY RESTRAIN CARE 1 (Jan. 2002), available at http://www.
hschange.org/CONTENT396/index.html.
21. Andresen, supra note 15, at 435 (noting that the likely consequence of man-
aged care denials of coverage is that the patient will forgo the procedure).
22. See Eleanor D. Kinney, The Brave New World of Medical Standards of Care,
29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 323, 329 (2001) (supporting the use of practice guidelines to
improve quality of care).
23. See Newton, supra note 4, at 724-27 (indicating that peer review is based on
the logical premise that only a physician's peers have the requisite expertise to evalu-
ate a physician's work and that the peer review process is currently flawed because
confidentiality problems undermine its effectiveness).
24. See Agrawal, supra note 16, at 27 (arguing that standards of professional con-
duct are an overlooked determinant of physician conduct which "can be used to
achieve results that evade both market forces and command-and-control
legislation.").
25. See Michael F. Anthony, NAT. HEALTH LAW. Ass'N., ENHANCED MEDICAL
STAFF CREDENTIALING, 3 Health L. Prac. Guide § 32:8 (2001).
26. See generally Agrawal, supra note 16.
27. Id. at 344-45.
28. See id. at 377-404.
[Vol. 11
6
Annals of Health Law, Vol. 11 [2002], Iss. 1, Art. 7
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol11/iss1/7
2002] Government Regulation In Quality Health Care 99
However, many of the existing self-regulatory mechanisms
are aimed primarily at physician conduct, and even then, some
question the value of such measures. Designed to encourage
physicians to participate in peer review activities, Congress en-
acted the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986
("HCQIA") 29 to promote self-policing. Under the HCQIA,
peer-review boards may take limited disciplinary action against
physicians for misconduct.30 Depending on the seriousness of
the misconduct, a physician may be questioned, counseled, disci-
plined, suspended, or even terminated.31 In conjunction with
the HCQIA, Congress established the National Practitioner
Data Bank ("NPDB") to gather and provide information re-
garding disciplinary actions against physicians.32 However, the
general public cannot obtain information contained in the
NPDB, nor can they directly report information to the NPDB.33
Even after physicians are disciplined for providing inadequate
care, they may be allowed to continue practicing. As a result,
some have complained that they can find out more about their
plumbers than their physicians.34
Although self-regulation, professional standards, and discipli-
nary mechanisms may have roles in promoting physician con-
duct, a lack of knowledge about the peer-review process and
resultant disciplinary actions may lead to the perception that
self-regulation is inadequate. In addition, such self-regulatory
measures may not sufficiently incentivize other health care pro-
fessionals and health care entities, or aid in promoting quality
within the corporate environment.
In the long-term care industry, for instance, it is often nurse's
aides and other attendants, not the physician, who provide much
of the day-to-day care to residents. Therefore, enhanced self-
regulatory measures and physicians' professional standards may
not have a significant impact on the level or quality of care pro-
vided to nursing home residents. In addition, since many long-
term care providers are motivated, at least in part, by profit, it
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101 (providing limited immunity for physicians that participate
in peer-review activities).
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. Kara M. McCarthy, Note, Doing Time for Clinical Crime: The Prosecution of
Incompetent Physicians as an Additional Mechanism to Assure Quality Health Care, 28
SETON HALL L. REV. 569, 593-94 (1997).
33. Id. at 597-98.
34. Id. at 598-99.
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can be argued that professional standards, guidelines, and self-
regulation will not adequately ensure that patients and residents
receive quality care, without some level of oversight. While in
some industry segments, self-regulation coupled with private ac-
creditation standards and utilization review may be sufficient to
ensure appropriate care, in the long-term care industry, self-reg-
ulation has not yet proven to be entirely successful in ensuring
quality care. Because it may be in the long-term care provider's
financial interest to limit services, resulting in potential quality
deficiencies, competitive pressures suggest that provider self-
regulation alone may not be sufficient to ensure minimum stan-
dards of quality.
B. Market Choice
Since the healthcare industry is financially influenced, other
commentators have suggested that market-place forces are suffi-
cient to maximize quality of care. 35 However, unlike consumers
of other markets, health care consumers often do not have free-
dom to choose their health care services on the basis of quality
and price. In many instances, consumers do not have a choice of
providers due to geographic limitations or lack of competition
among providers. In addition, recent health care consolidations
and mergers have minimized competition in many markets and
as a result of such mergers, or simply due to the size of the mar-
ket, many consumers have limited access to only a handful of
health care providers.36
Similarly, many health care consumers are constrained by em-
ployer selected insurance carriers and managed care providers.37
Such constraints affect not only the price consumers pay for
healthcare services, but also affect the level and quality of care
35. See Ruskin, supra note 5, at 652-53 (noting that in most other markets, con-
sumers chose their preferences based upon cost and quality in order to maximize
satisfaction).
36. See Karen Davis, Can the Market Ensure Quality Work Without Government?,
24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1127, 1131 (1999) (noting that between 1987 and 1997
there were 162 mergers or acquisitions involving HMOs and that by 1998 the ten
largest managed care companies were accounting for almost two-thirds of the nation's
HMO enrollment); see also AM. Hosp. Ass'N, TREND WATCH: MEDICARE'S POST-
ACUTE CARE CHALLENGE 3 (June 1999), available at http://www.ahapolicyforum.org/
trendwatch/twjunel999.asp (noting that the availability of post-acute care services
varies widely from region to region).
37. See Davis, supra note 36, at 1130 (noting that only 40 percent of America's
workforce is given a choice of two or more plans by their employer); see also Ruskin,
supra note 5, at 656.
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provided to the individual. In fact, there is some evidence that
only the largest employers consider quality of care when select-
ing managed care options for their employees. 38 And when con-
sumers do have choices among providers, many are unable to
meaningfully compare or reconcile the cost of health care ser-
vices with quality received. Even when costs are comparable
between health plans, consumers often lack the ability to com-
pare providers, understand disparities in the services offered, or
consider the quality of care provided among providers.39
Furthermore, health care consumers are often uninformed
about the education, experience, and qualifications of their care-
takers and do not understand how their caretaker's compensa-
tion arrangements may affect the delivery of care.n°
Additionally, consumers are often unaware of their health care
provider's history of isolated or systemic quality of care defi-
ciencies. As a result, many people are not selecting their health
care providers based upon independent or objective knowledge
of the provider's history. Instead, they may select their health
care provider because of their geographic convenience, religious
affiliation, or referrals from friends, neighbors, and co-workers.
They may even base their choices on appealing marketing cam-
paigns or other subjective factors.
Long-term care residents in particular are vulnerable to the
limitations of market-place regulation and often have limited
choices when selecting long-term care facilities. In many cases,
long-term care residents desire proximity to their families and
medical professionals. They may not have access to the best fa-
cilities, which often maintain high occupancy levels or are too
expensive. Similarly, long-term care residents are often too
weak, immobile, or infirm to be able to freely leave a facility.
As a result, market-forces alone cannot be the only mechanism
for ensuring quality of care in the long-term care environment.
Economic, geographic and informational disparities may limit
38. See Davis, supra note 36, at 1130 (indicating that only certain large employers
like General Motors, Ford, Xerox, GTE, and IBM, consult reports on plan quality
when making a plan selection. In addition, only 9 percent of employers with two
hundred or more employees require NCQA accreditation, and only 6 percent use
Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set ("HEDIS") data in selecting man-
aged care plans); see also Ruskin, supra note 5, at 669.
39. But see CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., NURSING HOME COMPARE,
at http://www.medicare.gov/Nhcompare/Home.asp (data last updated Mar. 21, 2002)
(providing a public forum to compare long-term care facilities on-line).
40. See generally Stone, supra note 2 (discussing how managed care financial in-
centives that limit services may inhibit the quality of care provided).
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the efficacy of the traditional market driven model that pro-
motes quality services at competitive costs in non-healthcare
markets.
C. Private Legal Actions
Under existing laws in most states, private individuals can
bring tort actions against their caregivers for assault, battery,
negligence, false imprisonment, medical malpractice, or other
causes of action in order to redress inadequate or sub-standard
care. 1 Each of these remedies may lead to compensatory dam-
ages for successful plaintiffs and may serve as a deterrent for
principled health care providers. However, there are several
reasons why private legal actions alone do not adequately pre-
vent sub-standard care.
First, in order to establish a prima facie case of an intentional
tort to a person, the plaintiff must generally prove intent, causa-
tion and damages. If proven, the plaintiff would usually be enti-
tled to compensatory damages, but because most intentional
torts are considered outside of the scope of employment, the
employer is generally not liable for such intentional actions and
most insurance coverage does not include intentional acts. As a
result, the plaintiff's recourse is usually against the individual
employee and, even if proven, it is often difficult for plaintiffs to
collect on such actions. Further, usually only in the most egre-
gious cases are punitive damages or government intervention
warranted. Consequently, absent statutory or regulatory over-
sight, there may be no direct incentive for the facility to adopt
significant corrective measures. Often a provider may perceive
such incidents as isolated events that are more indicative of a
human resources issue than a quality of care problem requiring
facility-wide attention.
Alternatively, plaintiffs may attempt to pursue any number of
negligence theories against long-term care providers for actual
injuries sustained that are caused by the provider or their
agents. Again, although such actions may result in compensa-
tory awards, liability coverage is often sufficient to cover the
damages and there may be little direct financial impact on the
provider that necessarily mandates corrective action. In addi-
tion, many incidents rising to the level of negligence may truly
41. But see McCarthy, supra note 32, at 571, 601-07 (noting that in egregious in-
stances of medical error, criminal prosecution by state or local prosecutors may also
be appropriate for assault, battery, reckless endangerment, neglect, or other crimes).
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be isolated incidents rather than an indication of systemic fail-
ure, and appropriate corrective action may not involve any sig-
nificant change in internal practices. Moreover, private tort
actions are reactive to actual incidences or failures to take ac-
tion. As a result, tort actions only promote quality through the
deterrent effect they have on reputable providers. Unless re-
quired as a condition of settlement, such actions generally will
not directly force providers to take corrective action in order to
prevent the recurrence of similar wrongdoing.
To redress some of these deficiencies, many states have en-
acted specific statutes which permit private causes of action
against owners and operators of nursing facilities for various
quality of care violations. In California, for instance, individuals
may pursue owners and operators of facilities under the Elder
Abuse and Dependant Adult Civil Protection Act for physical
abuse, neglect, or breach of fiduciary duty.42 Similarly, Illinois
enacted the Illinois Nursing Home Care Act to provide re-
sidents with a private cause of action for violation of residents'
rights.43 States such as New York,44 Missouri,45 Louisiana,46 and
others have adopted similar legislation to afford individuals with
a private right of action to enforce various regulatory violations.
Although laudable, many of these statutes may not serve their
purported intent and may have little effect on the promotion of
quality or the deterrence of sub-standard care. In New York, for
instance, at least one court has refused to impose strict liability
on a provider by reasoning that the statute was not intended to
change the normal negligence burden of proof.4 7 Similarly, in
Missouri, individuals must first file their complaint with the state
attorney general and only if the attorney general fails to initiate
a legal action may the individual proceed. 48 Even when success-
42. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 15600-15763 (West Supp. 2002).
43. See 210 ILCS 45/3-602 (2002); see also Stephen M. Levin, et al., Protecting the
Rights of Nursing Home Residents Through Litigation, 84 Ill. B. J. 36 (1996) (discuss-
ing the private right of action nursing home residents have in Illinois).
44. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2801-d(1)-(10) (McKinney 1993).
45. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 198.093(1)-(6) (WEST 1996).
46. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2010.9 (2001).
47. See Jeffrey Spitzer-Resnick & Maya Krajcinovic, Protecting the Rights of Nurs-
ing Home Residents: How Tort Liability Interacts with Statutory Protections, 19 NOVA
L. REV. 629, 633-34 (1995) (citing the holding in Begandy v. Richardson, 510
N.Y.S.2d. 984 (Sup. Ct. 1987)).
48. Angela Snellenberger Quin, Imposing Federal Criminal Liability on Nursing
Homes: A Way of Deterring Inadequate Health Care and Improving the Quality of
Care Delivered?, 43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 653, 674-75 (1999) (describing Missouri's Omni-
bus Nursing Home Act).
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ful, damages are often limited. 49 In fact, because of the limita-
tion on damages, statutory affirmative defenses, or other
exclusions from liability, there is little evidence that such actions
by nursing home residents are meaningful methods of promot-
ing quality.50 Accordingly, appropriate governmental interven-
tion remains necessary to promote quality of care and prevent
the provision of substandard services.
III. GOVERNMENT REGULATION AND OVERSIGHT OVER
QUALITY OF CARE
While self-regulation, market forces, and private tort actions
all serve important roles in the promotion of quality and deter-
rence of sub-standard care, long-term care providers have had
trouble sustaining quality standards, absent some level of gov-
ernment intervention. Even under the government's existing
regulatory and enforcement safety net, some long-term care
providers have been unable to achieve even minimal levels of
quality.51 As a result, the question is not whether the govern-
ment should have regulatory and oversight authority over long-
term care providers, but how much? 52
The nursing home industry contends that existing regulations
are burdensome and complex, that they contribute to the finan-
cial instability of the industry, and that regulatory enforcement
49. See id. at 677; see also 735 ILCS 5/2-1115 (1994) (where Illinois' General As-
sembly disallowed all punitive or vindictive damages in any case involving damages
for malpractice or in any healing art claim).
50. See Quin, supra note 48, at 677.
51. See, e.g., California Nursing Homes: Federal and State Oversight Inadequate to
Protect Residents in Homes With Serious Care Violations: Hearing Before the S. Spec.
Comm. on Aging, 10 5th Cong. 2 (1998) (statement of William J. Scanlon, Dir., Health
Financing and Pub. Health Issues, Health, Educ., and Human Serv. Div., U.S. Gen.
Accounting Office) (noting that between July 1995 and February 1998, California sur-
veyors cited nearly one third of all California nursing homes for serious care viola-
tions, and that the GAO believes this number is understated); see also GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NURSING HOMES: SUSTAINED EFFORTS ARE ESSENTIAL TO
REALIZE POTENTIAL OF THE QUALITY INITIATIVES 5 (2000) (noting the GAO's find-
ings- fifteen percent of the nation's 17,000 nursing homes (an unacceptably high
number) repeatedly had serious care problems that caused actual harm to residents or
placed them a risk of death or serious injury (immediate jeopardy)).
52. See William T. Gormley, Jr. & Cristina Boccuti, HCFA and the States: Politics
and Intergovernmental Leverage, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 557, 565 (2001) (ex-
plaining that nursing home regulation is a "zero-sum game" because regulations that
benefit nursing home residents usually come at the expense of the nursing home in-
dustry, which opposes more stringent standards and more stringent enforcement).
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is overzealous. 53 In support of these arguments, industry advo-
cates cite examples of alleged inappropriate sanctions.54 For ex-
ample, the industry has complained that pre-existing conditions
like pressure sores should not be the basis for deficiency cita-
tions.5 5 In addition, longstanding practices that have not previ-
ously resulted in serious harm, such a making hot coffee
available to residents or providing heaters, have been alleged to
be an insufficient basis for citation. 6 The industry further com-
plains that the system does not distinguish between minor in-
fractions and major problems.
Nevertheless, a review of the existing regulatory framework
reveals that the sanctions are intended to respond specifically to,
and in proportion to, the scope and severity of the conditions
causing actual harm or having the potential to cause harm.
Moreover, recent federal studies of nursing home care demon-
strate that many long-term care providers actually do have diffi-
culty attending to quality issues. 58  The current oversight
mechanisms for the long-term care industry have largely been
established as a safeguard in response to perceived and actual
deficiencies in the health care delivery system.59 Though not
53. See HHS Announces Task Force to Reduce Regulatory Burden, CAL. HEALTH
L. MONITOR, July 2, 2001, WL 13 SMCAHTHLM 7 (quoting HHS Secretary Tommy
Thompson, "[h]ealth care providers have been telling HCFA for years that many of
our regulations are overly burdensome."); see also AM. Hosp. ASS'N, PATIENTS OR
PAPERWORK? THE REGULATORY BURDEN FACING AMERICA'S HOSPITALS, 2 (2002),
available at http://www.aha.org/ar/Advocacy/paperworkreport.asp (finding that for
every hour of patient care, thirty minutes of paperwork is required, much of that
associated with regulatory compliance); see also GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NURSING
HOME OVERSIGHT: INDUSTRY EXAMPLES DO NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT REGULA-
TORY ACTIONS WERE UNREASONABLE, 4-9 (1999) (noting industry advocates' objec-
tions to the current regulatory process) [hereinafter Nursing Home Oversight].
54. See Nursing Home Oversight, supra note 53, at 1.
55. Id. at 4.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1.
58. See e.g., OFFICE OF EVALUATION & INSPECTIONS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., NURSING HOME SURVEY AND CERTIFICA-
TION: DEFICIENCY TRENDS, 2 (1999), available at http:// www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/oei.html;
OFFICE OF EVALUATION & INSPECTIONS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEPT. OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., LONG TERM CARE OMBUDSMAN PROGRAM: COM-
PLAINT TRENDS 1-3 (1999), available at http://www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/oei.html; OFFICE
OF EVALUATION & INSPECTIONS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEPT. OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERV., ABUSE COMPLAINTS OF NURSING HOME PATIENTS, 8-12 (1999),
available at http://www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/oei.html. See generally OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GEN., DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., SAFEGUARDING LONG-TERM CARE RE-
SIDENTS (1998), available at http://www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/oei.html.
59. See, e.g., Margaret M. Flint, Nursing Homes, NEW YORK ELDER LAW 274
(noting that in the early 1970's, New York State was rocked by extensive media cover-
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perfect,60 many of the government's oversight initiatives are in-
tended to redress industry-wide deficiencies.
A. Legislative Standards
Federal oversight over long-term quality of care is essentially
a multi-tiered process that includes minimum statutory and reg-
ulatory requirements, intermediate administrative remedies
with due process rights for violators, and civil, criminal, or other
administrative enforcement measures for egregious offenders.61
In addition to state licensing requirements, existing federal qual-
ity oversight measures impose pressure on providers to adhere
to minimum statutory and regulatory requirements through the
threat of denial of payment, civil monetary penalties, enhanced
monitoring, directed training, termination of the provider agree-
ment, or even expulsion from the Federal health care
programs.62
Quality of care at participating Federal health care program
long-term providers is governed by a variety of federal statutes
including the Nursing Home Reform Law of 1987 ("NHRL"),63
among several others.64  Long-term care providers must also
generally comply with a number of associated regulations,65 the
State Operations Manual ("SOM"), 6 6 and other informal gui-
age of deplorable conditions in nursing homes, and claiming that residents were ne-
glected and abused, and that government agencies charged with overseeing the
industry were unable or unwilling to protect residents). See also Denny, supra note 1,
at 206 (indicating that in 1974, one study showed that over 50 percent of skilled facili-
ties were approved for the Medicaid program despite life threatening safety
violations).
60. See Williams, supra note 11 (noting that not infrequently, regulations and in-
termediary and carrier interpretations are conflicting).
61. Quality of care in long-term care facilities is not limited to the Federal govern-
ment. Many state agencies, including state departments of social services, state attor-
ney general offices, Medicaid Fraud Control Units ("MFCUs"), and various
protection and advocacy agencies, may also become involved in certain quality of care
cases.
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(h)(2)(A)(i)-(iv).
63. See The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 ("OBRA-87"), Pub. L.
No. 100-203, § 4201, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(a)-(h) and 42 U.S.C. § 1396r (a)-
(h).
64. See e.g. U.S.C. § 1395cc (Agreements with providers of service); see also 42
U.S.C. § 1396a (State plans for medical assistance); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395c-5 (Obli-
gations of health care practitioners and providers of health care services; sanctions
and penalties; hearings and review).
65. See e.g. 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.10 et seq., and 488.3.
66. The State Operations Manual provides state survey agencies with the CMS
official guidance on survey tasks, procedures, and interpretations of law and
regulations.
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dance or written directives from the Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services ("CMS") (formerly the Health Care Financ-
ing Administration or "HCFA"). In addition, long-term care
providers must comply with a number of similar state statutes
and regulations, including state licensing requirements.6 7
Among the federal requirements, long-term care providers must
abide by regulations pertaining to quality of care, quality of life,
resident rights, physical environment, infection control, dietary
requirements, medical care, staffing, and others.68 The regula-
tions that specifically address quality of care further require
providers to approach specific resident issues associated with ac-
tivities of daily living, vision and hearing, pressure sores, urinary
incontinence, range of motion, mental and psychosocial func-
tioning, naso-gastric tubes, accidents, nutrition, hydration, as
well as a number of other special needs that a resident may
have.69
B. The Survey Process
CMS monitors compliance with long-term care requirements
through a survey and certification process administered by vari-
ous state regulatory agencies.70 State survey agencies conduct
unannounced surveys of nursing homes at least every 15
months71 or in response to complaints or allegations of resident
neglect or abuse72 and issue citations when providers are found
to be in substantial non-compliance with their conditions of par-
ticipation.73 In addition, CMS conducts validation surveys of a
representative sample of facilities within two months of the state
survey to determine whether the state surveys are adequate. 4
CMS will also initiate a survey when it has reason to question
the compliance of a facility with its requirements for
participation.75
67. See e.g. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. 10 § 415 et seq.; see also 210 I.L.C.S.
45/1-101 et seq., see also 77 ILL. ADMIN. CODE PART 300.
68. See 42 C.F.R. § 483.1 et seq.
69. See 42 C.F.R. § 483.25 et seq.
70. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(g) and 1396r; see also 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.300 et seq. and
488.110 (noting that the purpose of the surveys is to "assess whether the quality of
care, as intended by the law and regulations, and as needed by the resident, is actually
being provided in nursing homes").
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(2)(a); 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.305, 488.308.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(4); 42 C.F.R. § 488.332; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-
3(g)(1)(C).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(2)(a); 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.305, 488.308.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(3)(A).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(3)(D).
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In addition, surveys may be performed as frequently as neces-
sary to determine compliance, to confirm that corrective action
has been taken,76 or to measure whether certain changes, such
as change of ownership, have caused a decline in quality of
care. 77 When sub-standard quality of care has been determined,
the survey agency must also perform an extended survey to fur-
ther investigate the cause of the deficiencies.7 8
Whenever a provider is found in substantial non-compliance,
the surveying agency has a number of potential administrative
sanctions to address the deficiency, including potential termina-
tion of the provider agreement. 79 In determining the appropri-
ate remedy, CMS and the participating state survey agency must
conduct an initial assessment to establish the seriousness of the
deficiency and must also consider whether the facility's deficien-
cies constitute: (i) no actual harm with a potential for minimum
harm; (ii) no actual harm with a potential for more than minimal
harm; (iii) actual harm that is not immediate jeopardy; or (iv)
actual harm that is an immediate jeopardy to resident health or
safety. 80 In addition, the assessment must consider whether the
deficiencies are (i) isolated; (ii) constitute a pattern; or (iii) are
widespread.81 Following the initial assessment, CMS and the
state surveyors may consider other factors including, but not
limited to (i) the relationship of one deficiency to others; or (ii)
the facility's history of non-compliance. 82
By definition, a long-term care facility has provided sub-stan-
dard quality of care when it receives one or more survey defi-
ciencies related to [their] participation requirements under 42
C.F.R. § 483.13 (Resident behavior and facility practices),
§ 483.15 (Quality of life), or § 483.25 (Quality of care), which
constitute either immediate jeopardy to resident health or
safety; a pattern of or widespread actual harm that is not imme-
diate jeopardy; or a wide-spread potential for more than mini-
mal harm, but less than immediate jeopardy, with no actual
harm.83
76. 42 C.F.R. § 488.308(c).
77. 42 C.F.R. § 488.308(e).
78. 42 C.F.R. § 488.310.
79. See 42 C.F.R. § 488.406.
80. 42 C.F.R. § 488.404(a)-(b)(1).
81. 42 C.F.R. § 488.404(b)(2).
82. 42 C.F.R. § 488.404(c).
83. 42 C.F.R. § 488.301.
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C. Intermediate Administrative Sanctions
CMS uses scope and severity data collected in the survey pro-
cess to determine whether termination of the facility's provider
agreement is appropriate or whether some lesser sanction is
suitable.84 To avoid terminating the provider agreement in less
serious cases, CMS may impose intermediate administrative
remedies that include denial of payment, denial of payment for
new admissions, civil monetary penalties, state monitoring, a di-
rected corrective action plan, directed in-service training, trans-
fer of residents, closure of the facility, appointment of
temporary management, or other remedies approved by CMS.8 5
For instance, when the deficiencies are isolated and constitute
no actual harm, CMS or the state must impose one or more
"Category 1" remedies including: (i) directed corrective action;
(ii) state monitoring; or (iii) directed in-service training. 6
Where the deficiencies are more widespread, do not constitute
actual harm, but have the potential for more than minimal
harm, or if there are deficiencies constituting actual harm, CMS
or the state must impose one or more "Category 2" remedies
including (i) denial of payment for new admissions, (ii) denial of
payment for all individuals (imposed by CMS only), or (iii) civil
monetary penalties.87 If the deficiencies are serious constituting
immediate jeopardy to health and safety, CMS or the state must
impose "Category 3" remedies including either (i) temporary
management, or (ii) termination of the provider agreement, and
may also impose (iii) enhanced civil monetary penalties.88
When there are widespread deficiencies constituting actual
harm that is not immediate jeopardy, CMS and the state may
impose temporary management of the facility, in addition to
Category 2 remedies.89 Additional mandatory remedies exist
for repeat offenders or for those providers that are unable to
achieve substantial compliance within certain prescribed time
84. 42 C.F.R. § 488.406; see also Lake County Rehab. Ctr., Inc. v. Shalala, 854
F.Supp. 1329, 1340 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (finding that the Secretary of Health and Human
Services has the authority to terminate a provider agreement even without a finding
of immediate jeopardy).
85. 42 C.F.R. § 488.406(a).
86. 42 C.F.R. § 488.408(c)(i-iii).
87. 42 C.F.R. § 488.408(d).
88. 42 C.F.R. § 488.408(e); see also 42 C.F.R. § 488.410 (mandating termination of
the provider agreement or appointment of a temporary manager to remove the imme-
diate threat).
89. 42 C.F.R. § 488.408(e)(3).
17
Eremia: When Self-Regulation, Market Forces, and Private Legal Actions Fa
Published by LAW eCommons, 2002
Annals of Health Law
periods. 90 However, even when such sanctions are imposed,
providers have due process procedures for challenging such pen-
alties and may be able to eliminate, reduce, or forego actual
penalties for some period of time.91 As a result, though long-
term care providers complain about burdensome regulations, in-
consistent compliance monitoring, and punitive sanctions, they
do have the ability to contest the imposition of sanctions and
can force the government to prove alleged violations.
D. Problems in Measuring and Enforcing Quality of Care
Despite efforts to legislate, monitor compliance and enforce
quality of care requirements, the survey and certification pro-
cess has been criticized as being an ineffective apparatus for
measuring quality of care at long-term care facilities. At least
one commentator has argued that the state surveys emphasize
medical record documentation and are, therefore, not indicative
of a resident's actual condition. 92 Others have argued that the
survey process is flawed because "those with the most clinical
training are often forced to preoccupy themselves with adminis-
trative responsibilities." 93 Likewise, because the surveys are not
centrally administered, the issuance of deficiency citations be-
tween states may be inconsistent because of variance in individ-
ual interpretations of program rules.94
In addition, others have argued that CMS has significantly
eroded the legislative intent of Congress and the NHRL through
administrative dilution of the survey enforcement mechanism.95
It has been maintained that CMS used its informal guidance to
undermine the states' and federal government's ability to sanc-
tion providers. 96 Specifically, it is claimed that the survey regu-
90. See, e.g. 42 C.F.R. § 488.414.
91. See, e.g. 42 C.F.R. § 488.408(g); see also 42 C.F.R. § 498; First-Ever Decision
Reverses Nursing Home's Termination from Medicare Program, ANDREWS NURSING
HOME LITIG. REP., Feb. 9, 2001, WL 9 ANNHLTGR 3 (summarizing Carehouse Con-
valescent Hosp. v. HCFA, No. C-00-006 (H.H.S. Jan. 16, 2001), an unprecedented de-
cision dismissing most deficiencies and overturning a termination decision against a
facility).
92. See Schnelle et al., supra note 9, at 5.
93. Kapp, supra note 12, at 720.
94. See Quality of Care Sanctions Haphazardly Imposed, PA. Auditor Says, 8 No.
5 ANDREWS HEALTH L. LITIG. REP. 13 (Dec. 2000).
95. See TOBY S. EDELMAN, WHAT HAPPENED TO ENFORCEMENT? A STUDY OF
ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE NURSING HOME REFORM LAW 9 (Nat'l. Senior Citizens
Law Ctr. ed., 1999), available at http://www.nsclc.org.
96. See id. at 3.
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lations did not achieve the goals or purposes of the NHRL97
because CMS ceded to providers due process demands98 and sig-
nificantly relaxed its enforcement mandate. 99 For instance, even
when serious conditions may be present, there is evidence of in-
adequate investigation and corrective action, as well as evidence
that providers have been able to avoid sanctions by temporarily
correcting deficiencies. 100 There is also evidence that CMS has
in the past not adequately monitored state survey agencies and
has not appropriately evaluated the effectiveness of state survey
processes. 1°1 Supporting these contentions, Senator Grassley, a
Republican from Iowa, recently suggested that enforcement re-
form may be necessary. 10 2
Despite recent efforts by CMS to design an objective out-
come-based Quality Indicator ("QI") system to evaluate facili-
ties, 10 3 quality of care in the long-term care industry remains
exceedingly difficult to measure. 104 The Q1 system identifies 24
indicators of quality, derived from the Minimum Data Set
("MDS"), and groups them into eleven domains associated with
quality of care. 1°5 Those domains include accidents, behavior/
emotional patterns, clinical management, cognitive patterns, in-fection control, nutrition/eating, physical functioning, psycho-
97. Id. at 9.
98. Id. at 4.
99. See id at 5-6.
100. See generally Nursing Homes: Stronger Complaint and Enforcement Practices
Needed to Better Ensure Adequate Care: Testimony Before the Senate Special Comm.
on Aging, 1 06th Cong. (1999) (statement of William J. Scanlon, Director, Health Fi-
nancing and Pub. Health Issues, Health, Educ., and Human Serv. Div., U.S. Gen.
Accounting Office).
101. See generally Nursing Homes: Enhanced HCFA Oversight of State Programs
Would Better Ensure Quality of Care: Testimony Before the Senate Special Comm. on
Aging, 1 06th Cong. (1999) (statement of William J. Scanlon, Director, Health Financ-
ing and Pub. Health Issues, Health, Educ., and Human Serv. Div., U.S. Gen. Ac-
counting Office).
102. See generally Grassley, supra note 10 (noting existing enforcement measures
have not been consistent with OBRA's Congressional intent); see also Press Release,
University of California-San Francisco, Federal Enforcement of Nursing Homes may
be Inadequate, Say UCSF Researchers (Dec. 6, 1999), available at http://me-
dia.ucsf.edu/.
103. See generally Richard L. Butler & Steven B. Littlehale, Can HCFA's QIs
Really Identify Poor Care? Legal Implications for Defense Strategies, AM. HEALTH
LAW. Ass'N, LONG TERM CARE AND THE LAW SYMPOSIUM PAPERS, Feb. 5-7 (2001)
(on file with the author).
104. See id. at 6 (noting that prevalence-based measures are not necessarily indic-
ative of a provider's outcomes).
105. See id. at 2.
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tropic drug use, quality of life, and skin care. °6 Unfortunately,
the Q system may have its own inadequacies because, like the
survey process, the QI data represents a "snapshot" of resident
conditions at a point in time. °7 It is argued that "prevalence
based" QIs do not distinguish between pre-existing conditions
and those caused by a provider. At least one commentator has
argued that "incidence-based" indicators are a fairer means for
measuring quality of care because they better identify the nega-
tive outcomes that are caused by the facility. 10 8
Long-term care providers may also argue that the govern-
ment's enforcement efforts do not further the goal of promoting
quality of care. Specifically, it can be argued that punitive mea-
sures such as denial of payment and civil monetary penalties for
quality deficiencies divert monetary resources away from direct
patient care activities. Because such financial penalties may im-
pede quality improvement measures including staffing levels,
training, and facility improvements, the value of such financial
penalties may be questioned. Of course, the government's argu-
ment is that had those resources been "voluntarily" devoted to
quality improvement measures prior to the survey, the deficien-
cies may never have existed. Nonetheless, if providers are de-
voting resources to pay for, appeal, defend, or "prevent" survey
deficiency citations, rather than allocating such resources toward
overall quality improvement, the imposition of financial penal-
ties may arguably encumber the government's objectives.
As a result, the question remains: are existing regulatory and
oversight mechanisms too much, too little, or just right? Al-
though regulatory oversight does fill some of the voids left after
market-place and self-regulation, by deterring and penalizing
sub-standard quality of care, governmental regulation has not
eliminated quality of care concerns. Providers complain that the
requirements are too burdensome and that measuring compli-
ance with these standards may be too difficult. Similarly, long-
term care providers argue that the penalties are so onerous that
they impede quality. Conversely, repeated incidents of poor
care, complaints, and a number of federal studies suggest that
106. Id.
107. See id. at 5.
108. Id. at 6. But see MDS Quality Indicator Report, available at http://www.
hcfa.gov/projects/mdsreports/qi/qi-start.asp (noting that QI reports exclude those re-
sidents who were recently admitted to the nursing home or those recently admitted
after a stay in a hospital. In addition some QIs are "risk adjusted" to account for
residents who are frailer and sicker).
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quality is not improving and that enforcement actions alone
have not been effective in deterring or preventing inadequate
quality
Because of these perceived deficiencies in governmental over-
sight mechanisms, as well as ongoing quality of care concerns,
the federal government has explored other enforcement mecha-
nisms for use against inadequate providers. In addition to po-
tential sanctions from CMS through the survey process,
egregious quality of care violations may subject long-term care
providers to Federal civil prosecution and/or other administra-
tive sanctions for violating Federal health care program
requirements.
IV. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND QUALITY OF CARE
In conjunction with the United States Department of Justice
("DOJ"), the United States Department of Health and Human
Services Office of Inspector General ("OIG") has begun to fo-
cus on the delivery of care (independent of or in connection
with financial fraud, waste, or abuse) when resolving False
Claims Act ("FCA") 10 9 cases against nursing facilities. Though
somewhat controversial, the government has declared the FCA
to be a viable tool for pursuing inadequate care, 110 and the gov-
ernment has generally taken the position that claims and sub-
missions for reimbursement under Federal health care programs
are false if the services rendered do not meet minimum stan-
dards of care.'11
Under this theory, the government must overcome several
significant hurdles to prove its case. First, the prevailing view in
several circuits 12 is that the provider must either expressly or
109. 31 U.S.C. § 3729.
110. See David R. Hoffman, The Role of the Government in Ensuring Quality of
Health Care in Long-Term Care Facilities, 6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 147, 155 (1997); but
see Michael M. Mustokoff et al., The Government's Use of the Civil False Claims Act
to Enforce Standards of Quality of Care: Ingenuity or the Heavy Hand of the 800-
Pound Gorilla, 6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 137 (1997); see also John T. Boese, Can Sub-
standard Medical Care Become Fraud? Understanding an Unfortunate Expansion of
Liability Under the Civil False Claims Act, 29-SUM BRIEF 30 (2000).
111. See e.g. United States v. GMS Management-Tucker, Inc., No. 96-1271 (E.D.
Pa. 1996) (where the government alleged that claims were submitted for care that was
not rendered in compliance with federal regulations); United States v. Chester Care
Center, No. 98-CV-139 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (where the government alleged various inade-
quacies in the care provided to residents).
112. See e.g. United States ex rel. Siewick v. Jamieson Sci. & Eng'g. Inc., 214 F.3d
1372, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d
776 (4 t Cir. 1999); United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare
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implicitly certify compliance with applicable statutes, regula-
tions, or other compulsory rules requiring the provision of some
identifiable standard of care in order to obtain reimburse-
ment. 113 In the most recent case supporting this view, United
States ex rel. Mikes v. Straus, the court stated that the FCA is a
restitutionary statute, and therefore, "it would be anomalous to
find liability when the alleged non-compliance would not have
influenced the government's decision not to pay. 11 4 The court
went on to find that the Medicare forms do not include an ex-
press certification of quality and that statutes requiring compli-
ance with professionally recognized standards of health care
were conditions of participation, not conditions of reimburse-
ment. 5 Therefore, the court found the defendants not liable
under the FCA.116
However, other courts have deemed the FCA applicable
under the theory that providers implicitly certify compliance
with conditions of participation which generally require the pro-
vision of professionally accepted quality of care. For instance, in
United States ex rel. Aranda v. Community Psychiatric Centers of
Oklahoma, Inc., the court noted that "statutes and regulations
governing the Medicaid program clearly require health care
providers to meet quality of care standards, and a provider's
failure to meet those standards is a ground for exclusion from
the program" under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(6)(B). 1 7 Without
specifically addressing standards of care that may have been vio-
lated, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and
noted that:
It may be easier for a maker of widgets to determine whether
its product meets contract specifications than for a hospital to
determine whether its services meet 'professionally recognized
standards for health care.' . . .[But] a problem of measurement
Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir. 1997); United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d
1261, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1996).
113. See United States ex rel. Mikes v. Straus, et al., 274 F.3d 687 (Dec'd Dec. 19,
2001) (holding that implied certification theory is appropriately applied only when the
statutes or regulations expressly state that they must be complied with as a precondi-
tion to payment).
114. See id. at 697.
115. See id. at 697-702.
116. See id.
117. United States ex rel. Aranda v. Community Psychiatric Centers of
Oklahoma, Inc., 945 F.Supp. 1485, 1487 (Oct. 1, 1996) (where the government argued
that defendant "implicitly certif[ied] that it was abiding by applicable statutes, rules
and regulations" requiring provision to patients of "appropriate quality of care and a
safe and secure environment").
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should not pose a bar to pursuing an FCA claim against a pro-
vider of substandard health care services under appropriate
circumstances."18
In practice, although the outcomes of these cases were very
different, there may be little distinction between them because
the OIG's authority to exclude providers from participation in
the Federal health care programs for egregious violations of the
conditions of participation may limit the viability of not settling
such FCA actions.
In addition to the above theories of liability, the provision of
"unnecessary" or worthless services may also be grounds for an
FCA action if services are indicative of such a gross deviation
from the standard of care that the services provided, if any, are
of no value. 119 Under this theory, the government has the bur-
den of establishing the value, or lack of value, of services
provided.
In any instance, however, the government must also establish
that when the claim was submitted, the provider either know-
ingly, with deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity, or with
reckless disregard, billed the Federal health care program for
services. Finally, it seems that the government must prove that
the provider has actually deviated from an identifiable and ap-
plicable standard of care, by either providing inadequate, exces-
sive, unnecessary, or otherwise inappropriate services, thus
causing damages. Whether such deviation is from the standard
of care required for reimbursement or the standard of care re-
quired as a condition of participation, the government must fac-
tually show that such a deviation occurred and caused a bad
outcome.
120
Consequently, although some may argue that the FCA is an
inappropriate enforcement mechanism in quality of care
cases, 12 1 it is clear that the government has a significant burden
to establish liability, and therefore, the government is unlikely
to pursue such cases unless the government believes that the
118. See id. at 1488.
119. See Boese, supra note 110, at 36 (noting that the provision of unnecessary
services may be peripherally linked to the substandard care theory of liability); Ac-
cord Mikes, supra note 113, at 702-3.
120. See Joan H. Krause, Medical Errors as False Claims, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 181,
194 (2001) (noting that substantial medical literature describes variations in medical
practice that do not always correspond to bad outcomes).
121. See generally Robert Fabrikant and Glenn Solomon, Application of the Fed-
eral False Claims Act to Regulatory Compliance Issues in the Health Care Industry, 51
ALA. L. REV. 105 (1999); See also Boese, supra note 110.
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facts undeniably support such an action. However, when the
government asserts FCA liability for the provision of substan-
dard care, it is also clear that the provider may be subject to a
number of undesirable sanctions, including potential treble
damages under the FCA or administrative actions affecting their
participation in Federal healthcare programs.
A. Exclusion from Participation
Specifically, the OIG has authority to impose administrative
sanctions including civil monetary penalties ("CMPs") a22 or ex-
clusion 123 from participation in Federal health care programs for
a number of program related offenses. Although the OIG's en-
forcement efforts against nursing homes have historically been
focused on financial crimes, fraud, waste, and abuse of HHS
programs,124 the OIG does have authority to exclude providers
"for quality which fails to meet professionally recognized stan-
dards of healthcare.' 25 Nonetheless, except when individuals
or facilities have been convicted of criminal offenses relating to
the neglect or abuse of patients, the OIG traditionally has not
pursued exclusion of individuals or nursing facilities for quality
of care issues.126
Over the past several years, however, the OIG has increas-
ingly become interested in long-term care quality matters and
has begun to undertake certain oversight responsibilities.1 27 In
1999, the OIG's Office of Evaluations and Inspections ("OEI")
122. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a.
123. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7.
124. See e.g. Fraud and Abuse in the Provision of Medical Supplies to Nursing
Facilities, OIG Special Fraud Alert, Issued Aug. 1995, available at http://oig.hhs.gov/
fraud/docs/alertsandbulletins/081095.html (identifying several fraudulent billing
schemes by nursing facilities including schemes involving falsification of bills and
medical records as well as misrepresentation of services provided); see also Fraud and
Abuse in Nursing Home Arrangements with Hospices, OIG Special Fraud Alert, Is-
sued March 1998, available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/alertsandbulletins/
hospice.pdf.
125. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(6); see also Morris and Thompson, supra note 7, at
325 (noting that the National Medical Enterprises case (1994) highlighted the govern-
ment's focus on quality of care as a fraud issue).
126. But see Lorraine McCarthy, Substandard Care at Nursing Homes Results in
Sanctions Against Owner, 5 BNA HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. 549 (2001), citing
United States v. Chester Care CenterNo. 98-CV-139 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (one of the first
cases where the OIG excluded an individual for quality of care lapses).
127. See Elaine C. Zacharakis, Increased Federal Enforcement of Nursing Homes
Expected, 11 HEALTH LAW. 12 (1999) (noting that HCFA recently entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding with DOJ and OIG to better communicate and refer
egregious nursing home violations to the OIG and DOJ).
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conducted a series of studies on nursing homes, demonstrating
the OIG's interest in nursing home care. 2 8 In March 2000, the
OIG issued a final voluntary compliance program guidance for
the nursing home industry which identifies several risk areas, in-
cluding quality of care and resident rights, and describes the
"seven elements" that it feels are essential to have an "effective"
compliance program. 129 Since then, representatives from the
OIG have developed expertise in both nursing home reimburse-
ment and quality of care regulations and have fostered a num-
ber of relationships with industry sources to assist in evaluating
nursing home quality of care.
B. Quality of Care Monitoring
In order to avoid exclusion,13 ° providers that are subject to
potential FCA liability for providing substandard care may be
required to adopt enhanced intermediate sanctions as a condi-
tion of settlement. As part of FCA settlements involving quality
of care allegations, certain quality monitoring obligations may
be required in addition to the "traditional" Corporate Integrity
Agreement ("CIA").1 3 1 Like the traditional CIA, it is antici-
128. See generally OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., NURSING HOME SURVEY AND CERTI-
FICATION: DEFICIENCY TRENDS (1999), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-
02-98-00331.pdf; OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., NURSING HOME SURVEY AND CERTIFICA-
TION: OVERALL CAPACITY (1999), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-02-98-
00330.pdf ; OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., LONG TERM CARE OMBUDSMAN PROGRAM:
COMPLAINTS TRENDS (1999), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-02-98-
00350.pdf; OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., LONG TERM CARE OMBUDSMAN PROGRAM:
OVERALL CAPACITY, available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-02-98-00351.pdf ;
OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., PUBLIC ACCESS TO NURSING HOME SURVEY AND CERTIFI-
CATION RESULTS (1999), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-98-
00280.pdf ; OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., SAFEGUARDING LONG TERM CARE RESIDENTS
(1999), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/aoa/d9700003.pdf.
129. OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Nursing Facilities, 65 Fed. Reg.
14289 (Mar. 16, 2000). The seven areas include (1) the use of written policies, proce-
dures, and standards of conduct, (2) designating a compliance officer and committee,
(3) effective training and education, (4) effective communication, (5) enforcement of
standards by well-established guidelines, (6) internal monitoring for compliance, and
(7) prompt corrective response to perceived deficiency. Id.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b).
131. See Morris and Thompson, supra note 7, at 341-43 (describing the OIG's
CIAs and noting that traditionally, the CIAs have required that provider implement a
compliance program that includes: the Appointment of a Compliance Officer and
Compliance Committee, implementation of written standards including a Code of
Conduct, Policies and Procedures as well as the establishment of a Training and Edu-
cation program. In addition, such CIAs typically require the engagement of an Inde-
pendent Review Organization ("IRO") to perform financial reviews of the provider's
claim submission process.
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pated that the quality monitoring period will generally last three
to five years.
While there are several different quality monitoring models
that may be employed when systemic deficiencies are found, the
Quality Monitor's role should be to promote quality services
through the development of adequate internal systems. Viewed
as a collaborative and proactive effort rather than a punitive
measure, the OIG's quality monitoring seeks to promote quality
through systemic and outcome-based evaluations of the pro-
vider's practices.132 However, the quality monitor also enjoys
the freedom to use its discretion and evaluate subjective vari-
ables that may contribute to quality deficiencies. 133 Rather than
reacting to quantifiable declines in care, the GIG's quality moni-
toring methodology attempts to promote quality through opera-
tional evaluations and best practice recommendations. When
corrective actions are necessary, the Quality Monitor may make
recommendations or assist in implementing facility-wide poli-
cies, programs, or protocols. However, since each facility has its
own unique strengths and weaknesses, the Quality Monitor may
focus on promoting quality practices in the provider's most defi-
cient areas.
Under its terms of engagement, the Quality Monitor generally
performs a series of quality related evaluations aimed at identi-
fying a facility's actual or potential systemic problems. 34 Under
the GIG's model, the Quality Monitor is generally allowed un-
restricted access to facilities, as well as access to current or for-
mer employees, residents, and their families. The Quality
Monitor may also perform site visits, conduct interviews, make
assessments of staff qualifications, compile and analyze staffing
ratios or staffing data (such as turnover rates), review survey
and incident reports, and evaluate corrective action mecha-
nisms, in addition to other objective and subjective factors po-
tentially affecting quality. Among the objective data, the
Quality Monitor may also evaluate certain quality indicators to
determine the facility's performance in comparison with other
nursing facilities.
132. See Roy Snell, OIG and Vencor Outline Concerns About Monitoring Quality
of Care, New CIA Linking Financial and Quality Issues is a Challenge, J. OF HEALTH
CARE COMPLIANCE, 20, 21 (2001).
133. Id at 23.
134. It should be noted, however, that a series of seemingly isolated incidents may
be construed as systemic failure depending on the nature and timing of the events.
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Though potentially intrusive, it is not intended that the Qual-
ity Monitor will undertake operational control over the pro-
vider. Instead, the Quality Monitor is supposed to work with
the provider to identify risk areas, recommend corrective ac-
tions, recommend modification to operational practices if neces-
sary, measure resident outcomes, and make reports to the
provider and the OIG as to the facility's progress in implement-
ing sound quality practices. Among the monitoring methods
used, providers may hire outside consultants or engage qualified
internal specialists, or the government may oversee the quality
monitoring functions. In some cases, a combination of the
above may serve as the Quality Monitor.
Quality monitoring, however, is not without cost. Clearly,
providers who are required to engage quality monitors must pay
for such functions. Arguably, if the monitor is successful in pro-
moting quality practices, the provider may ultimately save
money in improved efficiencies, reductions in denials of pay-
ment, reduced civil monetary penalties, and reduced civil litiga-
tion. Nonetheless, providers will undoubtably argue that quality
monitoring requirements represent an additional layer of unnec-
essary and burdensome oversight. However, providers should
recognize that any quality monitoring required as part of FCA
settlements is in exchange for continued participation in Fed-
eral health care programs. And it is unlikely that such compre-
hensive quality monitoring requirements would be imposed
unless there is a clear indication of systemic quality of care
deficiencies.
C. Evaluation Sources
Though FCA quality of care cases are often predicated upon
specific failure incidents, in order to determine whether a Qual-
ity Monitor will be a condition of settlement, the OIG may eval-
uate information from a number of sources to determine
whether the provider has a more fundamental, systemic prob-
lem. In a FCA case, the qui tam Relator may be the best source
of information regarding quality of care deficiencies. In long-
term care facilities, qui tam relators may include present or for-
mer managers, administrators, nursing directors, individual
nurses, physicians, billing agents, or possibly even residents of
the facility. Such sources may provide the OIG with evidence
including photographs, billing records, internal written memos/
reports, equipment maintenance records, or other evidence sup-
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porting claims of substandard care and violations of a provider's
conditions of participation.
In addition, the OIG may examine the CMS Online Survey
Certification and Reporting ("OSCAR") data to determine
whether a Quality Monitor is warranted. With assistance from
consultants, the OIG may try to demographically compare facili-
ties to their peers. The OIG may also consult with state survey
agencies or attorneys general to determine whether a history of
problems with the facility or chain exists. In addition, the OIG
may consult with state ombudsmen 135 to obtain incident reports
and assessments. Similarly, the OIG may consult with resident
advocacy groups to obtain complaint information or any reports
of substandard care. Finally, the OIG may also review news re-
ports, court dockets, and other publicly available sources in its
assessment of the providers. Upon a review of the totality of the
circumstances, and a determination of systemic quality
problems, a Quality Monitor may become a required element of
the CIA and condition of settlement.
D. OIG Focus Areas
In addition to compliance with the statutory and regulatory
requirements pertaining to quality of care, 36 the OIG has iden-
tified the following issues as potential contributors to quality of
care deficiencies. Should a Quality Monitor be required as a
condition of settlement, a review of available integrity agree-
ments suggests that a focus of the monitor's attention may in-
clude the following operational functions, among others:
Operational Infrastructure Issues
" Compliance Officer & Committee with Quality Oversight
Responsibilities;
" Facility Level Individuals Charged with Quality Oversight
Responsibilities:
" Who Do Not Report Directly to CFO; and
" Have Direct Access to Compliance Staff.
Traditional "Voluntary" Compliance Mechanisms
" Written Compliance Plan Emphasizing Quality Measures;
" Confidential Disclosure Mechanism;
" Training and Education Program Focused on Quality;
" Written Policies and Procedures Relating to Quality.
135. The state long-term care ombudsman program was established under the
Older Americans Act of 1965. 42 U.S.C. § 3001 et seq.
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395r; see also 42 C.F.R. § 483 et seq.
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Internal Quality Review Functions
" Facility-Wide Quality Promotion Programs;
" Quality Data Collection/Assessment Mechanisms?
" Resident Satisfaction Surveys?
" Appropriate Data Assessment Methods?
" Identification/Knowledge of Specific Deficiencies/
Quality Indicators?
" Frequency & Quality of Internal Assessments?
" Quality Incentive Mechanisms?
" Effective Corrective Action Mechanisms
* Centralized Incident Reporting Mechanisms?
" Effective Communication Mechanisms?
" Appropriate/Timely Response to Incidents?
" Information Conveyed to Persons in Authority Positions?
" Disaster Preparation/Readiness
* Utility & Weather Contingencies?
" Appropriate Resources Devoted to Regular Internal
Reviews?
Employee/Staffing Issues
" Employee Background Checks?
" Promotion of Quality of Care
" Appropriate Training Program?
" Quality = Positive Factor in Determining Compensation?
" Staffing Ratio Per Resident and Per Shift?
" Level of Temporary Staff Utilization?
" Mechanism to Track Staff Turnover?
V. CONCLUSION
A review of the federal government's regulatory and over-
sight framework in the long-term care industry reveals that it is
intended to be a multi-level systemically-oriented mechanism
for remedying quality of care deficiencies. Though there are a
number of requirements for participation in Federal health care
programs, the objective of the government's regulatory and en-
forcement framework is to target those conditions that have led
to, or will likely lead to, resident harm. In response to perceived
and actual deficiencies, the legislative and regulatory framework
provides guidance as to the minimally acceptable levels of care
required for participation in, and reimbursement from, Federal
health care programs. In support of these requirements, the
government certifies long-term care providers through a survey
process aimed at identifying and correcting deficiencies and im-
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poses financial and/or more severe penalties when deficiencies
exceed prescribed levels of care. Isolated incidents and inci-
dents not causing actual harm are clearly handled differently
from widespread instances of actual harm. When deficiencies
are serious or place residents in immediate jeopardy of harm,
the facility may be subject to enhanced oversight or even termi-
nation of their provider agreement. 137 In extreme cases, new
management may be appointed, providers may be shut down, or
providers may be excluded from participation in Federal health
care programs.
When long-term care providers bill Federal health care pro-
grams for inadequate, unnecessary, or substandard services, the
government may attempt to pursue a FCA action to recover the
funds paid for such services. In connection with settlements in
such cases, when systemic quality of care deficiencies are pre-
sent, providers may be subject to enhanced proactive quality
monitoring obligations. Unlike punitive measures such as denial
of payment, civil monetary penalties, or denial of new admis-
sions, quality monitoring serves several important goals. In-
stead of excluding providers from participation, long-term care
providers are permitted to continue operations. As a result, the
government is not forced to relocate residents or take over the
provider's operations. In addition, the Quality Monitor may
work collaboratively with the long-term care provider in order
to establish "best practices" and promote organizational effi-
ciencies that improve care.
Nonetheless, long-term care providers continue to argue that
that the federal government's oversight and enforcement is ex-
cessive, despite the fact that self-regulation and market-place
regulation have been inadequate controls over quality of care.
As a result, government intervention aimed at pressuring long-
term care providers into compliance has been adopted. Such
multi-level oversight and enforcement mechanisms that allow
due process opportunities should theoretically serve to fill the
gaps inherent in the market-place, self-regulatory, and private
litigation oversight mechanisms described above.
Unfortunately, while some level of government oversight is
probably necessary to redress limitations of the market-place,
the existing framework may not entirely achieve the govern-
137. In egregious cases, providers may also be subject to potential tort liability
and state liability, but those remedies are afforded by the states in which the provider
operates and those remedies are generally aimed at redressing specific harms.
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ment's goals. In order to further promote quality and discour-
age sub-standard care, the government should consider
refinements to the existing mechanisms and should contemplate
the promotion of alternative quality incentives. In theory, mini-
mally intrusive oversight mechanisms that reward exceptional
providers and constructively penalize or eliminate sub-standard
providers may better optimize quality and cost.
Through either direct or indirect financial incentives, includ-
ing direct reimbursement or reduced monitoring for exceptional
providers, the government may more rapidly further its goals of
promoting quality and discouraging sub-standard care. 38 Re-
warding exemplary providers with quality promotion incentives
may help distinguish providers in competitive markets. How-
ever, in markets where there is no competition, other oversight
measures, including termination or exclusion of individual oper-
ators, may still be necessary. Such incentives and/or penalties,
however, must be balanced against the need to ensure appropri-
ate access to long-term care. Use of such financial incentives
may be tied to direct quality enhancement initiatives, including
enhanced training, increased staffing, or potentially even limited
facility improvements. Since staffing, in particular, has been
identified as an important determinant in quality of care, long-
term care providers and the government should determine what
levels of staffing are minimally acceptable.139 In addition, both
the state and federal governments should further determine or
refine appropriate reimbursement rates for resident conditions.
Such measures coupled with enhanced information dissemina-
tion may assist in closing the informational disparities that limit
the efficacy of market-place competition. Specifically, the fed-
eral government may be able to improve the propagation of de-
ficiency data and provide it to consumers so they will have the
ability to make informed choices. Furthermore, enhanced pub-
lic recognition of exceptional long-term care providers may im-
prove consumer awareness. In addition, when providers have a
demonstrated history of substantial non-compliance, the govern-
138. But see John E. Wennberg et al., Geography and the Debate Over Medicare
Reform, HEALTH AFFAIRS, (Feb. 13, 2002) (suggesting that higher spending may not
result in more effective care or better outcomes), available at http://www.healthaf-
fairs.org/WebExclusives/WennbergWebExcl_021302.htm.
139. But see Study: Nation's Nursing Homes Understaffed, CNN, Feb. 18, 2002,
(indicating that 91 percent of nursing homes do not have enough staff to provide
routine care in five areas, but suggesting that it may cost too much to mandate mini-
mum staffing levels), at http://www.cnn.com/2002/HEALTH/02/18/nursing.homes.un-
derstaffed/index.html.
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ment should more rapidly respond to such deficiencies with
heightened oversight remedies. Finally, the government should
exercise its termination and exclusion powers more frequently
when appropriate to eliminate habitual sub-standard facilities
and their operators from the marketplace.
The long-term care industry should also consider serious self-
regulatory improvements and standards to demonstrate their
commitment to quality. Until the industry is able to improve its
image by improving the care provided, regulatory oversight and
enforcement will probably be necessary. However, for the over-
sight and enforcement to be effective, appropriate, and mean-
ingful, the oversight mechanisms should supplement, but not
necessarily surmount, market-place competition and self-regula-
tory oversight.
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